tions inequality affects such position-taking. The main fi nding is that inequality tends to increase parties' antiglobalization backlash, an effect that does not signifi cantly differ across party families or globalization exposure but does get diminished with more generous redistributional policies. These fi ndings clarify the nature and origins of anti-EU and other aspects of anti-globalization backlash, and suggest how socio-economic conditions may be central to such backlash.
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A fundamental feature of political life involves how much national polities are open to global political and economic interaction. This is fundamental not least because it is a political choice with deep implications for wealth, peace and justice in the world. It is also a political choice never to be taken for granted, as is already evidenced by the rise of anti-globalization, isolationist sentiments in the party politics of Europe and elsewhere.
Recent increases in anti-immigration, anti-EU, protectionist, and general anti-internationalist position-taking by parties make it clear that the party-political basis for post-War pan-European and international economic and political engagement may be under threat. To understand this threat, one needs to understand when, where and why political parties might support and oppose globalization.
An often-discussed factor in such anti-globalization politics involves income inequality. Income inequality has risen in most advanced industrial democracies in recent decades, broadly parallel to and possibly refl ecting increases in European and international economic and political engagement (e.g . Wood 1990; Beckfi eld 2006) . Whatever its origins, such inequality has extensive and far-reaching implications for polities -including subjective insecurity, more criminality, longer and more irregular working hours, shortened life-spans, declining social and political trust, and subjective unhappiness (Wilkinson 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2006; Chamlin and Cochran 2006; Daly et.al.2001; Bell and Freeman 2001; Uslaner 2002; Rothstein et.al. 2005; Anderson and Singer 2008) .
As voters and their political representatives react to income inequality, they might well be expected to turn inward, retreating to familiar traditions on national shores rather than embracing global economic and political institutions and openness.
Whether this is so, however, remains unknown in existing studies of inequality and political economy. In the extensive attention to income inequalities, there has been little to consider their implications for anti-globalization backlash, and in the equally extensive literature on the politics of European and global integration there is little to explore whether support or opposition to such integration involves income distributions. The exceptions of note involve debate over inequality's implications for ethnic and anti-immigrant attitudes (Bilal et.al. 2003; Gerritsen and Lubbers 2010; Green et.al.1998b ). But there is virtual silence about inequality's implications for other faces and manifestations of anti-globalization backlash, such as Euroskepticism among political parties. Such a silence may be surprising, but it is symptomatic of the relative paucity of studies applying sociological insights to study of political and economic integration (Favell and Guiraudon 2009). This paper explores the role of inequality in shaping partisan support for and opposition to political and economic globalization. It does so theoretically by articulating the plausible implications of inequality for the positioning of parties towards various aspects of anti-globalization backlash. Exogenous sources of insecurities that themselves increase anti-globalization backlash, such as already-existing economic openness, might have stronger positive effects on anti-globalization sentiment under conditions of higher inequality. But the paper develops the expectation that inequalities ought also to have direct effects for anti-globalization backlash. Whatever its origins, income inequality can undermine economic securities and generate economic and political uncertainties that likely alter the position-taking of parties on globalization: leading them to consider options to redress these problems, among those options nationalist retreat. And inequalities may also give party entrepreneurs incentives and political opportunities to use anti-globalization sentiments as a form of blame avoidance and scape-goating. Such party responses to inequalities manifest themselves as nationalist backlash against global economic and political openness.
Such party responses to inequalities, however, might be expected to differ across different party families and socioeconomic policies. And they might particularly differ in the face of redistributive social policies: the reduction of inequalities through redistributive taxation and social policies might, net of their origins, diminish such insecurities in ways that plausibly reduce anti-globalization backlash.
The empirical focus of the study, developed in section two below, is on how income inequality affects party positioning with respect to anti-globalization backlash, using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project on party platforms in 22 OECD countries between 1960 and 2008. I focus on several measures of net anti-globalization position-taking, based on how much a party's platform expresses support for or opposition to trade protectionism, general international engagement, and European-Union integration. This gauges simple anti-or pro-globalization of parties in a given country and election-year. It provides more nuanced understanding of pro-and anti-globalization sentiment among parties than alternative measures, such as the existence or electoral success of fringe parties. And the measures provide leverage to consider variation in such sentiment over time and space, more than measures based on surveys or expert judgments. The explanatory analyses of these data, developed in sections two and three, focuses on how comparable measures of income inequality infl uence pro-and anti-globalization position-taking.
The principal conclusion of the empirical analysis is that income inequality tends to increase all measures of anti-globalization backlash in party platforms. Particularly with respect to net, or post tax and transfer, income inequality, political parties in settings with higher inequality tend to take more protectionist, anti-internationalist, anti-EU stances. These effects are generally not, it appears, signifi cantly different across different party families or electoral fortunes of parties, nor across different settings with respect to ex ante trade openness, unemployment, growth, or political institutions. On the other hand, government redistributional policies via taxation and social policies do tend to diminish any anti-globalization backlash arising from (pre-tax, pre-transfer) inequality. These results suggest that income inequality, already found to generate a range of domestic problems, is also an important and to some extent preventable contributor to nationalist, anti-globalization backlash.
Parties and Pro-and Anti-Globalization Positiontaking
How economic inequality infl uences the positions that political parties take on issues of economic and political openness is not obvious, a priori. One can expect domestic inequality to play an indirect role in shaping attitudes and partisan position-taking on globalization -by mediating the infl uence of background economic and political risk factors that themselves directly infl uence anti-globalization backlash. For instance, ex ante fl ows of trade, capital or migration might well generate economic and political risks in a polity that can be expected to spur anti-globalization movements throughout a party system (Burgoon 2009a) . The degree to which such openness spurs anti-globalization backlash, however, might be mediated by the income inequality prevailing in a polity.
Where openness unfolds in settings with high inequality, the latter might reveal or signal that globalization is not panning-out well for the polity. And such can fuel sentiment and political mobilization against future opennessanti-globalization backlash, hence.
Whether inequality has direct effects for anti-globalization position-taking is more uncertain. Inequality, unmoored from its own origins, might have no clear consequences for anti-globalization sentiments in a polity, and hence among parties. Indeed, some studies of anti-minority, anti-immigrant attitudes and actions reason that general economic deprivation can have many offsetting implications for such xenophobia such that general deprivation has no signifi cant end effect on such anti-globalization feeling (Green et.al.1998a (Green et.al. , 1998b . On the other hand, higher domestic inequality might plausibly increase support for international engagement and political institutions in order to compensate for the palpable economic failings of domestic governance and economic life. Such logic fi ts the fi nding that publics support European-Union integration where home institutions are palpably wanting (Sanchez-Cuenca 2000) . If so, one might hypothesize that inequality reduces anti-globalization sentiments and partisan position-taking.
My own expectation, however, is that domestic inequality may well play out among citizens and their party representatives in ways that directly increase anti-globalization positioning by political parties. Further, I expect that these direct effects might well be mediated by the partisan orientation of parties and by the social-policy setting within which parties respond to inequalities. I lay out each of these expectations in turn.
How inequality might spur anti-globalization backlash
Ex ante income inequalities can have strong direct effects on anti-globalization backlash via their effects on the preferences of voters and their party representatives. Net of its complicated origins, domestic income inequality has been shown in a range of studies to alter the economic preferences and sentiments of citizens, including higher preferred and actual working time, more subjective income insecurity and heightened stress (Bell and Freeman 2001; Alesina et.al.2004) . Such economic insecurities, in turn, can be expected to generate suspicion towards exposure to further global economic and political forces to the extent that past globalization has caused, or has been portrayed in the media and popular discussion to cause, income inequality. Such has long stated in much popular and scholarly political economy and media reporting, and may be politically salient regardless of the globalization in place in a given country-year (e.g. Beckfi eld 2005; Wood 1995; Kapstein 1996; Helpman et.al. 2008 ). If so, anti-globalization backlash might then be one of many possible ways of according blame to negative economic developments like inequality -where outside engagement and infl uences are the scapegoats for domestic inequality, along-side any other possible (domestic) scapegoats (Douglas 2005) . Hence, at least part of the political reactions to domestic inequality can be anti-globalization backlash.
More importantly, several characteristics of human cognition, well-studied by social psychologists, might lead citizens to respond to domestic inequality by focusing disproportionately on external, foreign scapegoats -and, hence, on anti-globalization. An old body of theorizing known as 'frustration aggression displacement theory'
suggests that economic hardships can spark a displacement of aggression, where the scape-goating turns to outsiders and external forces to one's own decision-making and volition (Dollard et.al.1939 ). More recent 'social identity theory' suggests that people dealing with hardships tend to blame out-groups to preserve their social identity (Tajfel 1981) . And work within 'relative deprivation theory' suggests how economic conditions and feelings of deprivation relative to other groups, particularly out-groups, can involve non-rational scape-goating of the latter to emotionally cope with economic hardships (Brown 1988; Runciman 1966; Tchitereke 2001; and De la Rey 1991) .
Related to these views is "attribution theory," an approach that suggest the strongest direct link of inequality to anti-globalization sentiment. Attribution theory focuses on how individuals make sense of and explain their individual position by attributing that position to factors that are (among other things) either internal or external to an individual's own volition and control (Kelley 1967; Weiner 1992) . Attribution is often self-serving, where negative developments are attributed to external factors while positive developments to internal factors of the individual's own doing (Hewstone 1983) . And this line of argument extends to the way negative developments are often attributed to out-groups and positive developments to in-groups, such that scape-goating tends to implicate out-groups more readily than in-groups (Taylor and Jaggi, 1974; Poppe 2001) . By this logic, individuals or polities judging economic inequality to be a negative development are likely to attribute this to out-groups and foreign infl uence, a process that can be expected to spur scepticism towards economic or political global contacts.
Empirically, social-psychological research has found signs of links between inequalities and other economic hardships to a range of acts and/or sentiments that are part of, or isomorphic to, anti-globalization backlash. Analysis of a range of national settings, using diverse methods, has found economic hardship generally and income inequality in particular to be sources of racist and ethno-centrist beliefs and violence (Glick 2005; Duckitt 1994 ); of anti-immigrant attitudes and violence (Poppe 2001; Morris 1998; Tshitereke 1999; Burns 2008; Crush and Pendleton 2007; Bilal et.al 2003; O'Connell 2005) ; of distrust of other national populations (Gerritsen and Lubbers 2010) ; and of scepticism towards various aspects of European integration (Hobolt and Lablond 2009; Burgoon 2009b; Cosmina and Colonescu 2008) . Some of these fi ndings are not without dispute, as some fi nd only weak correlation between economic hardships and xenophobia (Green et.al. 1998a (Green et.al. , 1998b Krueger and Pischke 1997) .
Accepting that there is debate about these empirical referents and the theoretical logic underlying it, attribution theory supports the expectation that voters within the polity will tend react to income inequality, whatever its origins and hence non-rationally, with sentiments that are more anti-foreigner, anti-global engagement than would otherwise obtain. If so, these reactions of citizens may be taken-up by representatives of political parties seeking votes of such citizens, a process that might well differ by party and circumstance, an issue to which I will turn momentarily. But if the median voter is likely to respond to economic inequalities and insecurities in ways that involve anti-globalization sentiment, then most political party platforms will tend also to express more antiglobalization sentiment.
Representatives of political parties may also respond to less directed voter discontent surrounding economic inequality by looking for ways to avoid political blame -such blame-avoidance being a hallmark of legislative volition (Mayhew 1974; Weaver 1986 ). This could involve party-political scape-goating autonomous from the social psychology of individuals experiencing economic hardship. The problems and divisions that inequality signals to political entrepreneurs should spark partisan search for politically-winning answers, and their search and choices can include anti-globalization that shapes or cues political mobilization to secure votes and win elections (c.f. Netjes and Edwards 2006; Steenbergen et.al.2007) . By this logic, partisan anti-globalization positioning refl ects not so much an aggregation of voter discontent as exploitation of it (Betz 1994; Jackman and Volpert 1996) . Such more cynical, strategic-positioning among party representatives underlie the same broad expectation emerging from social psychology of citizens in high-inequality settings: ex ante income inequality can be expected to spur partisan anti-globalization position-taking. Both logics underlie the fi rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1:
Higher income inequality should, all other things equal, yield higher economic insecurities, uncertainty and hardship that spark scape-goating of out-groups that includes anti-globalization position-taking among political parties.
How partisanship and redistribution might mediate the effects of inequality
Although inequality might increase anti-globalization position taking in general, as reasoned above, the degree to which it does so may be mediated by third political and policy conditions. Most obviously, differences in the ideologies and constituencies of political parties suggest that Left-Right partisanship will shape how parties respond to inequalities. Such partisanship involves starkly contrasting ideologies with respect to the role of government and with respect to markets, but also with respect to moral or cultural traditionalism and diversity (c.f. Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Kriesi et.al. 2006 ; Finally, inequality may infl uence anti-globalization backlash in ways mediated by redistributional tax provisions and social-policy protections that might remedy market-driven inequalities. In particular, pre-tax and pretransfer income inequality, or gross income inequality, can be expected to spark downstream political mobilization by parties to the extent that the insecurities of individuals are left as is, as it were left to fester. To the extent that social policies actually cushion or compensate for market inequality, they should diminish how much that inequality spurs anti-globalization backlash (Ruggie 1982; Bordo et.al. 2002) . Such policies can include redistributive taxes or broad social transfers, but they may also include policies facilitating economic adjustment, such as unemployment insurance providing time and resources to adjust, or active-labor-market programs providing training to adjust. Hence, we have an hypothesis about gross inequality:
Hypothesis 3a:
Higher pre-tax, pre-transfer income inequality should, all other things equal, spark less anti-globalization positiontaking to the extent that tax-transfer social policies and taxation systems are redistributive and generous to poorer citizens.
Finally, how much government policies lower gross inequality (captured by the gap between pre-and posttax-transfer income inequality) may directly signal effectiveness in cushioning the many sources of insecurities, and thereby diminish downstream nationalism. This follows from the converse of the arguments underlying Hypothesis One above: the ability of national policies to redress gross inequalities alleviate economic hardship should directly diminish scape-goating and anti-globalization backlash among citizens and their partisan representatives.
This provides a basis for a fi nal Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3b:
Greater redistribution, as shown by the difference between pre-and post-tax-and-transfer inecome inequality, should, all other things equal, diminish anti-globalization position-taking.
Anti-globalization position-taking and Income Inequality in Industrialized Countries
To empirically test these expectations, I analyze how inequality infl uences the anti-globalization orientation tion-taking on particular issues by the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) about an issue as a percentage of total sentences in the manifesto (Budge et.al., 2001; Klingemann et.al.2007; Laver and Garry 2000) . The measures capture salience of an issue to a party. But for some issues, the CMP separately measures positive and negative statements about policy, whereby scores gauge priorities of support or opposition to particular programs (Milner and Judkins, 2004) . Such measures may canvass party wishes more than do activities in power, where initiatives refl ect constraints and demands of coalition partners. 2 Some research has also found that in various domains manifesto scores predict party behavior in offi ce (Brauninger, 2005; Budge and Hofferbert, 1990; Klingemann et.al., 1994) , something emerging from the present data (see below). Using these data, in any event, I can measure party positions on anti-globalization position-taking and estimated this as a function of income inequality to explore and test Hypotheses One through Three.
Dependent variables: Anti-globalization in Party Platforms
The CMP data provide relevant and systematic measures to offer leverage to quantify anti-globalization across countries, parties, and time, and to judge how traditional party families relate to such position-taking. I construct a composite of support for and opposition to those measured features of platforms that gauge economic and political 1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 2 The coded CMP coding may suffer from measurement error and/or unreliability, as some research has shown with respect to subjective coding of the 'left-right' composite (Mikhaylov et al., 2008; Benoit et.al., 2009 ). However, the scale and implications of this for simpler measures built here remain unclear, and do not disqualify the CMP for systematic appraisal of party support for anti-globalization with broad cross-country and longitudinal coverage.
isolation 3 : (1) Net protectionism, support for and opposition to trade protectionism (per406 and per407, respectively); (2) Net anti-internationalism, opposition to and support for international institutions and global engagement (per109 and per107, respectively, in the CMP codes); and (3) and Net anti-European Union, opposition to and support for broader and deeper European integration (per110 and per108, respectively). These dimensions of antiglobalization are positively correlated with one another, but not very highly so (see, for instance, Appendix Two, The measures of anti-globalization position-taking vary substantially over time, country, and between parties in a given country-year. 4 The full sample (1481 party-country-year observations) of Net anti-globalization (narrow), for instance, has a mean of -2.198 (hence, the average party platform tending to be modestly pro-globalization the net). But this masks high sample dispersion (standard deviation of 3.5), ranging from -21.95 (Swedish 3 See Appendix One for a detailed wording of these platform elements. 4 Appendix Three provides the summary statistics.
Liberals in 1964 and the Japanese Renewal Party in 1993) -more than 20 percent of platforms being devoted to pro-free trade and internationalism net of any protectionist or anti-internationalist statements -to a maximum of 42.76 (Belgian "Walloon Rally" in 1978) . The Net Gini score range from 19.7 (Sweden in 1982) to 37.25 (Portugal in 2005) , with a sample mean of 27.94 (standard deviation 4.1), providing a good basis to explore whether income inequality infl uences partisan anti-globalization position-taking. To give a very broad sense of how this, Figure 1 captures how the party-system means of Net Gini scores, averaged from 1980 to 2008, correlate with party-system means for Net anti-globalization (broad). The expectation, as discussed above, is that this relationship be positive, as is indeed the case, though (7) Nationalist extreme-right parties (Lubbers et.al. 2002; Swank and Betz 2003; Mudde 2007; Carter 2005) . 5 I also focus on Left-to-Right partisanship that varies across time and party identity, based on the measure developed by Laver and Budge (1992) , Laver and Garry (2000) , but removing those components constituting this study's measure of Net anti-globalization -support for and opposition to internationalism and protectionism. With these changes, I generate a measure of Right partisanship, higher scores representing higher priority to Right positions, and lower or negative scores suggesting more priority to Left positions. 6 To measure social-policy generosity I focus primarily on Social security transfers as percentage of GDP (OECD, various years) measure unemployment, social-security, health and other transfers of welfare-state generosity with the best coverage. This measure imperfectly captures generosity, but is a very visible and concrete means by which polities might gauge welfare effort. Between 1960 and 2003, the sample mean is 13 percent, ranging from 3.7 percent (Japan in 1963) to 27.3 percent (Netherlands 1982) . I also compare the baseline results using this measure of generosity with measures of unemployment-related spending and of vocational enrolment.
Independent variables: Inequality and controls

Controls.
To address whether inequality infl uences partisan sentiments on globalization, it is important to control for a range of conditions that plausibly affect inequalities and anti-globalization position-taking. Important controls include the party-family dummies and social security transfers just discussed, but a number of others enter the baseline models. Trade Flows are exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP, with a sample mean of 65.6, a minimum of 9.1 and a maximum of 239.8 (Heston et.al. 2002) . Old-age population, is proportion of the population 65 and older, and can infl uence entrance into exposed sectors and has been shown to correlate negatively with support for extreme right parties (OECD, various years). Seats in parliament capture a party's proportion of seats in parliament in the previous election, measuring how much parties take positions that are genuine policymaking resolutions as opposed to "grand standing" (Sartori, 1976) . GDP growth captures how business cycles affect economic risks and perspectives of parties on how much globalization to champion (Heston et.al., 2002) .
Unemployment rate captures background socio-economic conditions, net of the simple business cycle, that some studies have found to infl uence anti-globalization positions (OECD, various). Finally, I consider total number of 5
That last is the most complicated, including not only the CMP coding of "national" or nationalist parties but also parties listed as extremeright nationalist parties by scholars of such. Where necessary, the parties in question are then coded as 0 for other party families in the default CMP categorization, for instance the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn. 6 Right partisanship = (per104 +per201 +per203 +per305 +per401 +per402 +per414 +per505 +per601 +per603 +per605 +per606) -(per1 03+per105+per106+per403+per404+per412 +per413 +per504 +per506 +per701 +per202).
sentences and the percentage un-coded sentences in manifestos to address possible measurement error, on grounds that these capture more diffi cult-to-code documents.
Estimation approach
The Any possible endogeneity due to simultaneity between anti-globalization position-taking and inequality is less likely to emerge, to the extent that the likely tendency of globalization to modestly spur domestic inequality (e.g. Beckfi eld 2006) would suggest any resulting bias to be negative, that is overstating a negative relationship between ex ante inequality and anti-globalization.
Results and discussion: Does Inequality Influence Anti-globalization Position-taking?
The main results relevant to Hypothesis One are summarized in Table One Parties with more seats in parliament, and in settings with more female legislators, and in party-systems with more parties, tend to be modestly less anti-globalization. Existing levels of trade openness (net of inequality) tend to have no signifi cant effect on anti-globalization, though is positively signed; and social transfers tend to be negatively signed but insignifi cant. More surprising is that unemployment levels and GDP growth tend not to signifi cantly alter anti-globalization sentiment in parties -at least net of inequality. (1)+(2) The most important fi nding revealed by the various models is simple: net income inequality tends to increase anti-globalization position-taking. Although the substantive size and signifi cance varies substantially across these anti-globalization measures -something that can be directly compared with the common scales -Net Gini scores meet standard thresholds of signifi cance in all the models. The effects are weakest for Net trade protection and strongest for Net anti internationalism. The results for the composites suggest that inequality's spurring of antiglobalization are, in a broad sense, additive: the results are stronger for all three models with the composites of anti-globalization, strongest for the full composite Net anti-globalization (broad) on the full sample (model 5).
ANTI-GLOB. BROAD (1)+(2)+(3)
ANTI-GLOB. BROAD (1)+(2)+(3) GINI
These results provide consistent support for the general expectation developed above that net income inequality can meaningfully increase anti-globalization backlash.
Whatever the stability and signifi cance of these effects, their substantive size are meaningful but modest.
Figure
Two below summarizes such size by focusing on Net anti-globalization (broad) in the full sample of parties and countries (model 5 in Table One) . Shown are the predicted values of such anti-globalization across the full range of the sample variation in net inequality. Shown also are the 95-percent upper-and lower-confi dence intervals in the full distribution (Tomz et.al. 2000) . in support for globalization (increase in " anti-globalization") that corresponds to moving from roughly the 25 th to the 70 th percentile of the sample distribution of Net anti-globalization (broad). The increases in globalization that a given country can be expected to undergo judging by the sample experiences, however, suggests an appreciably more modest effect of inequality, with the increase in US inequality in the last decade predicting an increase in Net anti-globalization from -2.7 to -1.2 (roughly the 60 th to the 65 th percentile in the sample distribution of such antiglobalization position-taking). This is modest, to be sure, but not trivial in terms of the sample distribution. How this translates into actual shouting, hemming and hawing about trade, European integration and/or global engagement generally, is more diffi cult to surmise from these data. But even here, substantial party ink is being spilt on anti-globalization in the face of rising inequality.
Beyond the direct relationship between inequality and anti-globalization position-taking, I also considered a range of ways in which that relationship might be mediated by other forces. Many aspects of such mediation are intuitively plausible but turn out empirically to be very modest or non-existent. For instance, measures of ex ante actual exposure to trade, capital, or immigration -or composite measures of such, such as the KOF globalization index (Dreher 2006 ) -are quite highly correlated with inequality, and in any event do not interact signifi cantly with inequality in shaping anti-globalization. These and many other interactions yield inequality to strongly spur anti-globalization sentiment regardless of most party-specifi c or national circumstances already presented in Table   One . pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality ("Gross Gini index scores") have less positive or more negative effects for Net anti-globalization in settings where social policies are more generous. Models 1 to 3 in Table Three consider where social policy is more generous. These provide broad support for Hypothesis Three (a). Although this is not immediately clear from the tabular results, further analysis of the interaction between inequality and inequality, summarized in Figure Three below, reveals that at any level of social-security transfers below the 49 th percentile, inequality signifi cantly increases anti-globalization backlash (broad). Above that level of social protection, however, gross inequality no longer has such a signifi cant positive effect (Brambor et.al. 2005 ). Second, the Table considers the direct measure actual reduction inequality resulting from all tax and socialpolicy transfer programs, drawing on the measure of the pre-tax-pre-transfer inequality on the one hand and posttax-post-transfer inequality on the other (SWIID 2009). Hypothesis Three (b) expects that settings where this reduction in inequality is greater are settings that are less likely to have parties embracing anti-globalization backlash. This is, indeed, what emerges from the data, as model 4 summarizes. We have, hence, support also for Hypothesis Three (b).
All these reported results are robust to a range of alternative specifi cations and estimators. First, they hold up to removing any or all right-hand side controls; adding other specifi cations of controls (e.g. other measures of globalization, like the KOF index, capital openness or immigration); running the models with fi xed country or party-family effects; removing outliers in the anti-globalization backlash or inequality measures; removing (stepwise) any one country from the sample (or jack-knifi ng standard errors).
Second, the results hold upon looking at other measures of anti-globalization positioning. This applies to focusing on only the protectionism, anti-internationalism, or anti-EU without taking further account of pro-freetrade, pro-internationalism, or pro-EU statements. The results are virtually identical using other measurements of composite Net anti-globalization, for instance standardizing the components before their addition, whereby the relatively greater platform attention to (for instance) the EU does not drive results. Third, similar results emerge from alternative measures of inequality, such as the raw WIID database on Gini or p90/p10 spreads, despite their problems with cross-national and/or longitudinal comparability. And study of the structure of inequality -such as inequality at the upper-end of the distribution relative to the median, as opposed to inequality at the lower-end of the distribution relative to the median -reveals that particularly upper-register inequality spurs anti-globalization. This is not surprising given that such inequality is what has most grown in recent decades in OECD settings.
Third, the results are robust to alternative estimators. Results are very similar in random-coeffi cient, randomintercept models, where such models converge. They are also very similar in other embedding structures of multilevel models, such as three-level models of parties within party families within countries, or of parties within a given election-year of a country. The results are also robust to OLS fi xed effects with clustering of standard errors by country, FGLS, panel-corrected standard errors, and lagged dependent variables. Such insensitivity and robustness to the basic patterns suggest that the messages emerging from Tables One to Three are not simple artifacts of statistical technique.
Conclusion
This study has explored whether and under what conditions income inequality infl uences party positiontaking on anti-globalization backlash. The theoretical insights focus on the possibilities that domestic inequality, whatever its origins, can spark feelings of insecurity and deprivation, and in turn unleash attribution or scapegoating of out-groups that manifest themselves in anti-globalization backlash. The empirical inquiry focused on extensive information about the position-taking of political parties in OECD countries since 1960, combined with comparable data on income inequalities, and on a range of political economic conditions relevant to anti-globalization politics. The principal fi nding has been that income inequalities, left unchecked by social-policy protections, do indeed tend to spur protectionism, anti-internationalism, and anti-EU backlash in the position-taking of parties.
Such responses appear to hold net of a wide range of other background conditions, and appear to hold regardless of ex ante openness, party color, or other political-economic conditions. An important fi nding, however, is that such effects need not and are not always left unchecked. Redistributive social policies and other provisions appear in the above analysis to cushion how inequality plays out for globalization politics. Pre-tax and pre-transfer inequality has substantively stronger spurring effects for anti-globalization backlash when ex ante social policies are modest than when such policies are generous.
These fi ndings should be seen as part of a larger research agenda focused on socio-economy of antiglobalization backlash. Further inquiry should develop and explore other measures and manifestations of antiglobalization backlash among parties -beyond anti-EU integration, trade protectionism, and international engagement generally. It should also focus on the implications of inequality that are up-and down-stream from the party-positioning investigated here. More upstream are the individual and group attitudes and interactions that inequality plausibly unleashes -for instance in studies of public opinion on subjective insecurities and economic hardship, and on European integration, anti-immigration, and nationalism. And more downstream might be studies of how inequality and party-positioning on anti-globalization affect protectionist or nationalist policies of nation states. The present study, however, provides important information on inequality and globalization politics:
It not only adds an important consequence to the litany of known problems emerging from inequality, but also suggests the agency of government policies to mitigate that consequence.
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